These are supplementary notes for Van Zandt (2003) . They include certain extensions. To be in synch, these notes and the main paper should have the same date.
Model
Compared to the model in Van Zandt (2003) , our only modification is to allow the communication cost and surcharges to vary among senders. Let c j be the cost per message sent by sender j, so that the cost to sender j of targeting types X j ⊂ T is c j γ(X j ). The net payoff of sender j given X and c j is π j (X; c j ) ≡ s j σ j (X) − c j γ(X j ) .
Each n-tuple c ≡ c 1 , . . . , c n ∈ R n + of communication costs thus defines a game Γ c in normal form in which the players are the n senders, each sender's strategy set is B, and sender j's payoff function is π j (·; c j ). By an equilibrium for Γ c , we mean a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Equilibrium
Let c ∈ R n + . It is still the case that the game Γ c can be decomposed into independent single-receiver games. For t ∈ T , let Γ c (t) be the single-receiver game for type t. This is the game in normal form in which (a) there are n players; (b) each player's strategy set is {0, 1}, where 0 means "not send" and 1 means "send"; and (c) player j's payoff, given the strategy profile x ≡ x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ {0, 1} n , is u j (x; c j , t) ≡ s j t j (min{1, m/#x}) − c j x j = 1 0 x j = 0 .
Proposition 1 Γ c (t) has a pure strategy equilibrium for all c ∈ R n + and t ∈ T .
Given a strategy profile X ≡ X 1 , . . . , X n , the payoffs in Γ c given X are equal to the averages of the payoffs in the games Γ c (t) given X 1 (t), . . . , X n (t) . That is:
. . , X n (t); c j , t) dγ(t) .
Proposition 2 then follows easily.
Proposition 2 Let c ∈ R
n + . A strategy profile X 1 , . . . , X n is an equilibrium for Γ c if and only if, for γ-a.e.t ∈ T , X 1 (t), . . . , X n (t) is a pure-strategy equilibrium for Γ c (t).
Corollary 1 Γ c (t) has an equilibrium for all c ∈ R n + .
The proofs of these two results are the same as when all senders face the same cost, and so they are omitted.
Assumption 4.1 in Van Zandt (2003) is also maintained in this paper.
Proposition 3 Let j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and c
n−1 be a profile of strategies for senders other than j. Then sender j has a unique best response to X −j given c j . That is, max X j ∈B π j (X j , X −j ; c j ) has a solution and it is unique up to equivalence. Denote this solution by X * j (X −j ; c j ).
Strategies that maximize the senders' total payoffs
Assumption 4.1 implies that, for c ∈ R n + , {s j t j − c j | j = 1, . . . , n} contains n distinct nonzero elements for γ-a.e. t ∈ T . Thus, there is a unique strategy profile that maximizes the total net payoffs of the senders in the game Γ c , and it is given by
n . As when all senders have the same communication cost, inefficiency from the point of view of the senders arises from too much rather than too little information, and tends to be worse when the communication cost is lower. We summarize this in Proposition 4. Part 1 says that the total communication in equilibrium is greater than or equal to the total communication given 
Let c ∈ R
3. Let C be the set of costs c ∈ R 
Type-dependent mechanisms for allocating attention
The use of type-dependent mechanisms is essentially the same as when senders have the same cost.
For example, suppose the mechanism designer uses a price mechanism P : T → R + so that the surcharge on targeting B ⊂ T is B P (t) dγ(t). This defines a game Γ (c,P ) in which each sender's strategy set is B and sender j's payoff, given
If, for each t ∈ T , P (t) is equal to the (m + 1) st highest value of s 1 t 1 − c 1 , . . . , s n t n − c n or to 0, whichever is greater, then for each j,
Therefore, Y c is an equilibrium for Γ (c,P ) .
Allocating attention through uniform surcharges
We allow the surcharges to depend on the identify of the sender and denote them by p ∈ R n . We say that p supports Y c if Y c is an equilibrium of the game Γ c+p .
Proposition 5 confirms, not surprisingly, that we need only consider positive surcharges rather than subsidies.
Proposition 5 Let c ∈ R
Proposition 6 shows that the negative results on using uniform surcharges to support the strategy profile that maximizes the senders' payoffs persist even when we allow the surcharges to depend on the identity of the sender.
Proposition 6 Let
Our next result concerns the case where supp(γ) = ∆ n−1 and m = 1. For this result, we assume that the communication cost is the same for all firms and we restrict attention to identical surcharges for all firms.
There may not be any marginal receivers; so, if small enough, a surcharge does not induce senders to drop receivers whom they should target in the efficient profile. The difficulty is that, in order to support Y c , a surcharge must be large enough to eliminate information overload. The parameter values for which these two requirements can be reconciled is limited. (1) n = 2;
(2) n = 3 and s
In this case, the surcharge
Demographic data and types
This section describes a more primitive model of the receivers and the information the senders have about them. Because the purpose is to provide intuition rather than a mathematical framework to be used elsewhere in the paper, we consider a finite model. The model with a large dispersed population of receivers and types of receivers is meant to be an approximation of this finite model.
There is a finite set A of receivers. The senders have a common mailing list, which gives the name and address of each receiver. The mailing list also gives demographic information such as age, sex, race, place of residence, job title, and magazine subscriptions. Let D be the finite set of possible demographic characteristics. Let Z: A → D be a function that specifies the characteristic of each receiver.
The senders also have marketing data, which gives the correlation between these characteristics and the interest in the senders' messages. Specifically, let A j ⊂ A be the set of receivers who are interested in j's message. 
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The structure of the game that we use in this proof is that each player has a fixed payoff of 0 from not sending a message and each player's payoff from sending For the left-hand division, income is partly informative and γ is uniform on the simplex ∆ 1 . For the middle division, income is uninformative and γ is concentrated on 1/2, 1/2 . For the right-hand division, income is fully informative and γ is concentrated on 1, 0 and 0, 1 . a message is decreasing in the number of other players who also send a message but does not depend on the identities of these players.
Let c ∈ R n + and t ∈ T . For j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let l j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} be such that sending a message is a best response for sender j in Γ c (t) if and only if at most l j − 1 other senders send messages. Specifically,
Renumber the senders if necessary so that l 1 ≥ · · · ≥ l n .
Imagine that the senders sequentially choose to "enter" (send a message), basing this decision only on the number of senders who have already entered. Let k + 1 be the first player to choose not to enter. That is,
Since sender k finds it profitable to enter, l k ≥ k. Since l 1 ≥ · · · ≥ l k , senders 1, . . . , k − 1 still find it profitable to send a message given that a total of k senders do so. Since player k + 1 chooses not to enter, l k+1 < k + 1. Since l k+1 ≥ · · · ≥ l n players k + 2, . . . , n also find it unprofitable to enter given that k players have already done so. Hence, it is an equilibrium that players 1, . . . , k send a message and players k + 1, . . . , n do not.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let c j ∈ R + , and let X −j ≡ X 1 , . . . , X j−1 , X j+1 , . . . , X n ∈ B n−1 be a profile of strategies for senders other than j. Let X − t (resp., X + t ) be the set of types t for whom j has a strict (resp., weak) incentive to send a message given c j and X −j (t). That is, Proof of Proposition 4. 1. We show that for γ-a.e. t ∈ T , #X(t) ≥ #Y c (t). Let t be such that X 1 (t), . . . , X n (t) is an equilibrium for Γ c (t); this holds γ-a.e. according to Proposition 4.2. If at least m messages are sent in this equilibrium, i.e. if #X(t) ≥ m, then #X(t) ≥ #Y c (t) since #Y c (t) ≤ m (receivers are never overloaded in the efficient strategy profile). Otherwise, #X(t) < m and each sender's message is processed for sure, as would also be the case if one more sender sent a message. Assume that s j t j − c j = 0 for each j, which holds for γ-a.e. t ∈ T . Then sender j sends a message in this equilibrium if and only if s j t j − c j > 0. This is true also for the efficient strategy profile when this inequality holds for at most m senders. Hence, #X(t) = #Y (t).
Let
> c j ,
Suppose c = 0. For any t ∈ T , sending a message is a strictly dominant strategy for sender j in the single-receiver game for type t unless t j = 0. Assumption 4.1 implies that γ{t ∈ T | t j = 0} = 0. Hence, in the game Γ c the strategy T or a set equivalent to T is a strictly dominant strategy for each player. However, this is not the efficient strategy profile since then γ-a.e. receiver would be overloaded. Thus, 0 / ∈ C.
Up to equivalence,
Hence, there is η such that γT η > 0. Let c belong to the nbd. of c such that
Finally, note that if s j = c j for all j, then Y c j = ∅ and this is also a dominant strategy for j; therefore, s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ C and C = ∅.
Assume that supp(γ) = ∆
n−1 . Let F be the set of subsets of {1, . . . , n} with m + 1 elements. Given F ∈ F and c ∈ R n + , let t F (c) be the unique element of R m+1 such that, for all i, j ∈ F , j∈F t , and so
Therefore, because of the claim and because Equations 1 and 2 are equivalent,
which is convex since it is defined by linear inequalities. The coefficients of the linear inequalities defining C are positive, so that if c ∈ C and c ≥ c, then c ∈ C. This ends the proof, except for the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we prove the forward implication by proving its contrapositive. Suppose there are F ∈ F and j ∈ F such that m m+1 Suppose n > 4. Then the left-hand side of equation (8) is the sum of three or more terms, each of which is larger than the two terms summed on the right-hand side. Hence, the left-hand side is necessarily larger than the right-hand side.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 7.
